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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
ASSESSING THE JURISDICTIONAL
LOOPHOLES IN THE ROME STATUTE
MELISSA K. MARLER
INTRODUCTION
Beginning in June of 1998, representatives from most of the
world’s nations met at a conference in Rome to finalize a statute cre-
ating an international criminal court. Amid much controversy, the
members of the conference finally adopted such a statute, with 120
countries voting in favor of it, seven against it, and twenty-one ab-
staining.1 The International Criminal Court (“ICC”) will come into
existence once sixty nations ratify the treaty.2 During negotiations,
some of the most controversial issues proved to be those related to
the ICC’s jurisdiction. This Note will explore some of those issues.
In particular, the Note concentrates on the jurisdictional restric-
tions included in Article 12 of the statute and the “opt-out” of juris-
diction over war crimes embodied in Article 124. Part I traces the his-
tory of international criminal prosecutions up to the adoption of the
Rome Statute. Part II outlines the provisions of the Rome Statute
that are relevant to this Note. Part III analyzes the probable conse-
quences of Article 12’s jurisdictional provisions and Article 124’s
“opt-out” provision for war crimes.
The Note concludes that, while it is unfortunate that the custo-
dial state was not included under Article 12 as one through which the
1. See Xavier Baron, Statute for War Crimes Court Adopted, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
July 18, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2323165.
2. See Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 126, 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter
Rome Statute]. To date, 95 countries have signed the statute, and seven have ratified it. The
seven ratifying countries are Senegal (Feb. 2, 1999); Trinidad and Tobago (Apr. 6, 1999); San
Marino (May 13, 1999); Italy (July 26, 1999); Fiji (Nov. 29, 1999); Ghana (Dec. 20, 1999); and
Norway (Feb. 16, 2000). See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Ratification
Status (visited Dec. 27, 1999) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm> (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (listing updated information on signatures and ratifications).
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ICC could obtain jurisdiction, in practice this omission will not allow
perpetrators of international crimes to escape prosecution altogether,
as human rights organizations have argued. In addition, the opportu-
nity that Article 124 provides for a state to opt out of jurisdiction
over war crimes for seven years after the statute’s entry into force for
that state may weaken the ICC to some extent, but it will not prevent
as many prosecutions as the human rights organizations fear.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although the idea of prosecutions for international crimes is an
old one,3 actual prosecutions have been relatively rare. There is little
incentive for states to prosecute their own nationals for crimes perpe-
trated against the people of another state, especially one with which
they are at war.4 In fact, war crimes themselves may help states to
prevail in wars, and perpetrators of war crimes are often members of
a state’s own armed forces. In cases where leaders of oppressive re-
gimes commit international crimes against their own people, there is
little possibility of prosecution; the people who are committing the
atrocities often control the judicial system. In addition, no permanent
framework has ever been in place to prosecute international crimes
on an international level. Despite these disincentives and structural
difficulties, however, states have banded together to prosecute inter-
national crimes in some instances.
A. World War II and Its Aftermath
After the atrocities committed by the Nazi regime during World
War II, the international community was outraged at the extent of
the cruelties human beings could perpetrate against each other. Al-
though no international framework existed for prosecuting these
3. See John Dugard, Bridging the Gap Between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law:
The Punishment of Offenders, 324 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 445-46 (1998) (stating that the
first international war crimes trial occurred as early as 1474).
4. See id. at 453 (arguing that the political bases for nonprosecutions, particularly with
respect to members of the security or armed forces of a state, result in the poor record of na-
tional courts in prosecuting war crimes and other international crimes arising out of armed con-
flicts); see also Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction
in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 153 (1996):
Since war criminals often operate with the knowledge and assistance of local political
and legal authorities, domestic law does little to deter these actors. Prevention and
punishment of war crimes thus become legal concerns and moral obligations, not just
for those governments in whose territory crimes occurred, but for all states.
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crimes, most international observers felt that Nazi leaders should be
punished.5 The Nuremberg Tribunal proceeded under the relevant
Hague6 and early Geneva Conventions,7 even though neither “con-
tained explicit penal provisions.”8 While the Nuremberg trials
achieved the purpose of signaling to the world that the behavior of
the Nazis was unacceptable, the trials were conducted by the Allies
and their basis in international law was unclear. Thus, the trials were
open to criticism as a biased reflection of “victors’ justice.”9
In a further reaction to the crimes of Hitler’s regime, the four
Geneva Conventions of 194910 expanded on earlier treaty law to cre-
ate a vast body of legal provisions governing conduct during wartime.
These conventions established the grave breaches system, under
which state parties are required to criminalize certain acts and must
either prosecute perpetrators of those acts in their own national sys-
tems or extradite them to another state that is willing to prosecute
them.11 However, even with this “unequivocal” obligation to prose-
cute or extradite,12 prosecutions of violators of these international
5. See Matthew Lippman, The Pursuit of Nazi War Criminals in the United States and in
Other Anglo-American Legal Systems, 29 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 8 (1998) (“The Allied Powers
repeatedly condemned Nazi atrocities during World War II and warned that those who perpe-
trated these barbarities would be prosecuted and punished.”).
6. See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277 (Hague Convention IV).
7. See Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat.
2021, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 (Geneva Convention III).
8. Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L.
554, 564 (1995). John Dugard, however, observes that both the Geneva and Hague Conven-
tions “contemplate prosecution and punishment of those individuals who violate their norms.”
Dugard, supra note 3, at 445.
9. U.N.: Sec-Gen Says Establishment of International Criminal Court Is Gift of Hope to
Future Generations, M2 PRESSWIRE, July 21, 1998, available in 1998 WL 14097073.
10. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condi-
tion of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75
U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31. Most states are bound by
these conventions. For a list of signatories, see International Committee of the Red Cross,
States Parties and Signatories (visited Dec. 5, 1999) <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebNORM?
OpenView> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
11. See Meron, supra note 8, at 564.
12. Id. at 555.
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norms have been rare, owing to “lack of resources, evidence and,
above all, political will.”13
During and after Nuremberg, many states and nongovernmental
organizations began to recognize that a permanent international tri-
bunal would be necessary to deal with such outrages should they oc-
cur again in the future. The United Nations commissioned a study as
early as 1948 to explore the possibility of establishing a permanent
international criminal court.14 At the same time, however, the Cold
War occupied much of the world’s attention, precluding any mean-
ingful progress toward establishing such a court.15 Serious violations
of humanitarian law continued to occur during this period, but no in-
ternational regime existed to punish offenders. For example, neither
the activities of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia nor Iraq’s use of poi-
son gas against its Kurdish citizens has been punished, either nation-
ally or internationally.16
B. War Crimes Prosecutions After the Cold War
In 1989, with the Cold War coming to a close, the International
Law Commission began work on a draft statute for an international
criminal court.17 The disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the
violations of international humanitarian law that occurred in the pro-
cess,18 as well as the 1994 genocide in Rwanda,19 provided dramatic
confirmation that an international criminal court was indeed still
needed, perhaps more urgently than previously believed.20
13. Id. at 555-56.
14. See Brigid O’Hara-Forster, Justice Goes Global, TIME INT’L, July 27, 1998, at 46.
15. See id.; see also Adam Sage, Nailing War Criminals, TIMES (London), Sept. 1, 1998, at
35 (reporting that the establishment of a “permanent [international] tribunal to prosecute per-
petrators of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity . . . . was shelved during the
Cold War, resuscitated after the fall of the Berlin Wall and given dynamism after the butchery
in Bosnia and Rwanda”).
16. See Meron, supra note 8, at 554.
17. See O’Hara-Forster, supra note 14, at 46.
18. For a detailed historical description of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, see
Deborah L. Ungar, The Tadić War Crimes Trial: The First Criminal Conviction Since Nurem-
berg Exposes the Need for a Permanent War Crimes Tribunal, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 677, 682-84
(1999).
19. For a description of the Rwandan genocide, see Paul J. Magnarella, Some Milestones
and Achievements of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The 1998 Kambanda and
Andakayesu Cases, 11 FLA. J. INT’L L. 517, 517-20 (1997).
20. See O’Hara-Forster, supra note 14, at 46. (“[W]hat really galvanized the international
community was the chaotic disintegration of Yugoslavia and the atrocities that accompanied
it.”).
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1. The Ad Hoc Tribunals. The international community strug-
gled to find a way to deal with the gross violations of humanitarian
law that occurred in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. No interna-
tional framework was yet in place to enforce international humani-
tarian law against the offenders, but most observers recognized that
the nations involved could not be left to prosecute the offenders on
their own.21 As heinous acts such as “mass killings, massive, organized
and systematic detention and rape of women, and the continuance of
the practice of ‘ethnic cleansing’, including for the acquisition and the
holding of territory,” continued in the former Yugoslavia, the United
Nations decided to take action to bring the perpetrators to justice.22
In 1993, the United Nations Security Council, acting under its broad
Chapter VII authority,23 created a special international tribunal to
prosecute those responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia.24 After the genocide in
Rwanda in early 1994, the United Nations Security Council estab-
lished a similar international tribunal to prosecute the perpetrators.25
2. Assessing the Ad Hoc Tribunals. The very creation of these
tribunals represented a significant step forward in the prosecution of
international crimes. South African jurist Richard Goldstone, the
original chief prosecutor for both international tribunals, described
them as “the first real international attempt[s] to enforce
international humanitarian law.”26 Unfortunately, they have also been
extremely inefficient. Two years of preparation and negotiation were
21. See Catherine Cisse, The International Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda: Some Elements of Comparison, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 104
(1997) (“The conflicts in Yugoslavia and Rwanda have revealed . . . the inadequacy of the na-
tional judicial systems to effectively and impartially punish those responsible for violations of
international humanitarian law.”).
22. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993)
(establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”)).
23. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 39-51. These articles, entitled “Action With Respect to
Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression,” empower the Security
Council to “determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of
aggression” and “make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken . . . to main-
tain or restore international peace and security.” Id. art. 39.
24. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 22, at 2. The tribunal was to prosecute violations of inter-
national law that occurred between January 1, 1991, and “a date to be determined by the Secu-
rity Council upon the restoration of peace.” Id.
25. See S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453rd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955
(1994) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”)).
26. O’Hara-Forster, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting Richard Goldstone).
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needed in order to establish the tribunals.27 As valuable as they and
their decisions would be as precedent in the enforcement of
international humanitarian law,28 it became even more obvious that a
permanent international court would be necessary to deal with such
offenses. Not only could the repetitious and time-consuming process
of forming a separate tribunal for each incident be avoided, but
smaller-scale incidents that would not by themselves warrant the
establishment of special tribunals could be handled.29
The problems encountered in obtaining custody over those in-
dicted by the Yugoslav tribunal have demonstrated that it is difficult
to prosecute offenders at the international level without some coop-
eration from their territorial states.30 Similarly, although the Rwan-
dan tribunal has made an important contribution to international
criminal law by issuing a judgment on genocide,31 it is doubtful
whether the tribunal will have a real impact in deterring future
crimes of the same nature, because it will be unable to try a signifi-
27. See id. (quoting Professor Meron, who explained that one advantage to having a per-
manent court would be that it would “avoid having to spend six months looking for a prosecu-
tor . . . and a year looking for a building”).
28. For example, the ICTY has found Anto Furundzija, a former local commander of a
Bosnian military group, guilty of war crimes. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, 38
I.L.M. 317 (I.C.T.Y. 1999), available in Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (visited Jan. 12, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/furundzija/trialc2/judgment/main.htm> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). It also has found Dusko Tadić guilty of war crimes. See International Criminal Tribu-
nal for the Former Yugoslavia: Excerpts from Judgment in Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadić, No. IT-
94-1-T, 36 I.L.M. 908 (I.C.T.Y. 1997). For a complete listing of the ICTY’s judgments, see Trial
Chambers and Appeals Chamber Judgements (visited Jan. 12, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/icty/judgement.htm> (on file with the Duke Law Journal). For a complete
listing of the ICTR’s judgments, see International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (visited Jan.
12, 2000) <http://www.un.org/ictr.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
29. See O’Hara-Forster, supra note 14, at 46.
30. See, e.g., Kevin Sullivan, Is Time up for Bosnia’s Accused? NATO Is Toughening Its
Stance Toward War Criminals, 25 of Whom May Be in Serb Republic, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 29, 1998, at 6 (reporting that, of the 29 people under public indictment who
were not in custody at the time, 25 were “believed to be at liberty in the Serb Repu blic”).
31. See Press Release AFR/94 L/2895: Rwanda International Criminal Tribunal Pro-
nounces Guilty Verdict in Historic Genocide Trial (Sept. 2, 1998) <http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/1998/19980902.afr94.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (announcing the
“first-ever judgement by an international court for the crime of genocide,” in which the ICTR
“found Jean-Paul Akayesu guilty of genocide and crimes against humanity”); see also Press
Release AFR/95 L2898: Rwanda Tribunal Hands Down Life Sentence for Crimes of Genocide
Committed by Former Rwandan Prime Minister (Sept. 4, 1998)
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1998/19980904.l2898.html> (on file with the Duke Law
Journal) (reporting a genocide judgment against Jean Kambanda).
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cant number of the tens of thousands of perpetrators of the Rwandan
genocide.
These two tribunals significantly affected the eventual develop-
ment of a statute for a permanent international criminal court. In
their early years, they were seen as an experiment whose success or
failure would have an enormous impact on the eventual creation of
such a court.32 Today, despite the tribunals’ shortcomings, supporters
of an international criminal court claim that the tribunals have
proven that international prosecutions for gross violations of interna-
tional law are workable. Supporters further argue that having a per-
manent court in place would help to resolve the difficulties the tribu-
nals have experienced.33
II. THE ROME STATUTE
Against this historical background, a United Nations diplomatic
conference was held in Rome in the summer of 1998 to finalize the
statute for the permanent International Criminal Court.34 As the con-
ference progressed, however, several problems became apparent.
Many states, most notably the United States, were concerned that
allowing the ICC to exercise powers traditionally reserved to states
would negatively impact national sovereignty.35 In particular, the
ways in which the ICC could obtain jurisdiction and the crimes to
32. See James Podgers, The World Cries for Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1996, at 56 (noting
that as of 1996, the tribunals had not yet had much success and suggesting that, if they were not
effective, their impact would likely be to discourage rather than to encourage the establishment
of an international criminal court).
33. See, e.g., Richard Goldstone, Prosecuting International Crimes, an Inside View, Confer-
ence Luncheon Address, 7 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (1997) (“[T]he practical
experience gained through the work of the two Tribunals. . . . has had, and will continue to
have, a great deal of effect on the drafting and establishment of a permanent court as it comes
into being.”); O’Hara-Forster, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting Deputy Prosecutor Graham
Blewitt of the ICTY as saying, “‘We have been a model for the creation of the new court.”);
David Stoelting, Status Report on the International Criminal Court, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y
SYMP. 233, 241 (1999) (“[P]rior ad hoc international criminal tribunals have demonstrated the
feasibility of criminal law enforcement through international tribunals.”); see also O’Hara-
Forster, supra note 14, at 46 (noting that a permanent court would avoid the extra effort in-
volved in establishing ad hoc tribunals).
34. See Baron, supra note 1.
35. In fact, during the Bush administration, the United States attempted to delay the for-
mation of an international criminal court indefinitely. Michael Scharf, a State Department offi-
cial who handled issues relating to the formation of an international criminal court under
President Bush, recalls, “‘One of my jobs, which I did not enjoy . . . was to find ways to stall it
forever.’” O’Hara-Forster, supra note 14, at 46 (quoting Michael Scharf).
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which that jurisdiction would apply were deeply divisive questions.36
This part will introduce and examine the statute’s major jurisdictional
provisions.
A. How the ICC Obtains Jurisdiction
The conference participants quickly rejected a scheme of univer-
sal jurisdiction under which nationals of any state, regardless of
whether their state was a party to the treaty, could be tried before the
ICC for international crimes. States such as the United States, which
feared an overly independent court, clearly could not be persuaded to
accept such widespread jurisdiction.37 Instead, the United States ad-
vocated a much narrower position on the other extreme wherein a
state’s government would have to consent prior to any prosecution of
one of its nationals before the ICC.38 It soon became clear that this
position also would not succeed because the circumstances in which
the ICC could obtain jurisdiction would be rare if such a requirement
were imposed, since states usually would prefer to try the person in
their own national courts or not at all.39
In a last-minute attempt to write some degree of state consent
for prosecution of nationals into the statute, the United States and
India proposed an amendment that would have limited the require-
ment for prior state consent to situations involving “acts of officials
or agents of a state in the course of official duties acknowledged by
the state as such.”40 Demonstrating increasing frustration with the
United States’ efforts to weaken the ICC, as well as a commitment to
a strong court with or without the support of the United States, the
conference participants wholeheartedly rejected the amendment.41
36. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Media Alert: Automatic Jurisdiction,
Independent Prosecutor Emerge as Most Contentious Issues in Rome (July 9, 1998)
<http://www.lchr.org/icc/rome/romealt2.htm> [hereinafter Automatic Jurisdiction] (on file with
the Duke Law Journal).
37. See O’Hara-Forster, supra note 14, at 46 (“The Washington negotiators . . . rejected
universal jurisdiction.”).
38. See Theodor Meron, The Court We Want, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1998, at A15.
39. See id.
40. Id.  It is unclear how much this limitation would have narrowed the state consent re-
quirements, however, as such acts often will be the basis for prosecutions. See infra note 60.
41. See, e.g., Coalition for an International Criminal Court, A Court Is Born, 1 ON THE
RECORD (July 17, 1998) <http://www.advocacynet.org/cgi-bin/browse.pl?id=icc22.html> [here-
inafter A Court is Born] (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (announcing that, with a majority
of 113 and 25 abstentions, the committee accepted a Norwegian proposal “that no action be
taken” on the proposed U.S. amendments).
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The system of jurisdiction upon which the conference finally
agreed allows the ICC to exercise jurisdiction over genocide, war
crimes, and crimes against humanity.42 However, this jurisdiction ex-
tends only to cases in which either the state on whose territory the
acts in question occurred or the state of which the accused is a na-
tional is either a party to the statute or has accepted “the jurisdiction
of the Court with respect to the [crime in question].”43 For example, if
a national of State A commits genocide, a crime against humanity, or
a war crime on the territory of State B, then the ICC would be able to
exercise jurisdiction over the suspected perpetrator only if either
State A or State B were a party to the Rome Statute or had accepted
the jurisdiction of the ICC over that specific crime.44 Many confer-
ence participants supported the inclusion of the state that currently
has custody of a suspect as a state through which the ICC could ob-
tain jurisdiction, but this provision was dropped late in the confer-
ence in order to garner wider support for the statute.45
B. “Opting out” of War Crimes Jurisdiction
Another hotly debated issue at the conference was whether a
state would automatically consent to jurisdiction over the core crimes
upon becoming a party to the statute or whether it could opt out of
jurisdiction over some of them.46 While nearly all participants agreed
that jurisdiction over genocide should be automatic, the United
States, as well as other “key countries,” such as France, argued that
states should be allowed to “consent separately” to jurisdiction over
war crimes and crimes against humanity.47 The United States, for in-
stance, supported a proposal that would have allowed states to opt
42. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, 37 I.L.M at 1003-04. A further restriction con-
cerning the exercise of jurisdiction over war crimes was added in Article 124. See id. art. 124, 37
I.L.M. 1068. For a detailed discussion of this provision, see infra Parts II.B., III.B. The statute
also provides for ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but only after that crime has
been defined internationally. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 5, 37 I.L.M. at 1003-04.
43. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 1010.
44. This provision is possibly subject to Article 124’s opt-out provision for jurisdiction over
war crimes. See infra Parts II.B, III.B (discussing in detail the opt-out provision).
45. See “Fight to the Finish” on International Court (July 17, 1998)
<http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press98/july/icc-fnl1.htm> [hereinafter Fight to the Finish] (on file
with the Duke Law Journal) (noting that “previous formulations” of the jurisdictional provi-
sions were “less restrictive” and had been “supported by a large majority of delegations”).
46. See Automatic Jurisdiction, supra note 36.
47. Id.
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out of jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity for
ten years while still accepting automatic jurisdiction as to genocide.48
The statute as adopted allows states to opt out of jurisdiction
over war crimes, but not crimes against humanity, and for a period of
seven years instead of ten:
Notwithstanding article 12 paragraph 1, a State, on becoming a party
to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after the
entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of
crimes referred to in article 8 [war crimes] when a crime is alleged to
have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declara-
tion under this article may be withdrawn at any time.49
This provision was included during a late stage of the negotiations,
apparently to ensure that France would support the statute.50 France,
like the United States, has a large number of soldiers serving in
peacekeeping missions throughout the world and has shared the
United States’ concerns that such peacekeeping forces might be sub-
jected to politically motivated prosecutions for war crimes before the
ICC.51
48. See U.S. Dep’t of State: Daily Press Briefing, M2 Presswire, July 22, 1998, available in
1998 WL 14097590. According to the United States, such a provision would have protected its
peacekeeping troops from possibly groundless and politically motivated prosecutions for war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The United States claimed that it wanted a chance to “see
the court in action” before accepting jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity.
Id.
49. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068.
50. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ROME TREATY FOR AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE MAIN ISSUES 3 (1998) (noting
that the opt-out provision was inserted to meet French concerns); A Court Is Born, supra note
41 (stating that the opt-out provision was a “last-minute compromise to France” and that
“NGOs feel that it creates a gaping loophole that could make it impossible to arrest major
criminals”).
51. Not everyone shared these concerns. See Ethirajan Anbarasan, A Decisive Victory,
UNESCO COURIER, Oct. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10846839 (quoting William Pace,
leader of the NGO coalition that favored creation of an international criminal court, as saying
that “[t]he overwhelming majority of nations which contribute peacekeeping troops did not
share the concerns about [prosecution of members of peacekeeping forces for war crimes] ex-
pressed by France and the U.S.”).
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III. FEARS OF HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS: WILL
PERPETRATORS OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMES GO UNPUNISHED?
Many human rights organizations argue that the provisions of
the Rome Statute do not do enough to ensure that perpetrators of in-
ternational crimes will be punished. The exclusion of the custodial
state as a basis for jurisdiction and the inclusion of the opt-out clause
have caused particular concern. Many organizations worry that the
exclusion of the custodial state as a basis for the ICC’s exercise of ju-
risdiction will allow international criminals to travel freely,52 and one
critic has referred to the opt-out provision as a “‘licence to kill for
seven years.’”53
This part will explore the concerns generated by both of these
provisions. First, it will examine the probable consequences of the
exclusion of the custodial state as a basis for ICC jurisdiction, con-
cluding that, while an ideal court would include the custodial state, its
exclusion will not in practice allow international criminals to travel
freely. Next, this part will examine the probable consequences of the
opt-out provision for war crimes in several possible scenarios and will
conclude that it will not lead to total impunity for war criminals.
A. Exclusion of the Custodial State as a Basis for Jurisdiction
The exclusion of the custodial state as a state through which the
ICC can obtain jurisdiction has been attacked widely by human rights
organizations. Jelena Pejic, head of the Lawyers Committee for Hu-
man Rights delegation to the Rome Conference, complained that
“[t]he proposal would give criminals a get-out-of-jail-free card.”54
Richard Dicker, leader of the International Criminal Court Cam-
paign of Human Rights Watch, stated, “This court gives a passport to
traveling tyrants.”55 Dicker’s statement evidences his belief that the
statute’s jurisdictional provision would allow human rights violators
to travel freely without the worry of being brought before the ICC to
52. See infra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
53. Sage, supra note 15, at 35 (quoting Denis Robiliard, President of Amnesty Interna-
tional in France).
54. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Media Alert: Lawyers Committee Denounces
Jurisdiction Provisions of ICC Proposal (July 17, 1998) <http://www.lchr.org/icc/rome/
romealt717.htm> [hereinafter Lawyers Committee Denounces] (on file with the Duke Law
Journal).
55. Fight to the Finish, supra note 45.
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answer for their crimes.56 He argues that even if the suspects cannot
be brought before the ICC if they remain at home (because their
states are not parties to the statute, for example), they should at least
be subjected to the ICC’s jurisdiction if and when they venture out of
the safe havens of their home states.57
In addition, Jerry Fowler, legislative counsel for the Lawyers
Committee for Human Rights, argues that excluding the custodial
state was not necessary under international law.58 Because interna-
tional law already allows individual states to try perpetrators of geno-
cide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity under the principle of
universal jurisdiction,59 “there surely is no bar to a group of states
joining together to set up a court that does the same thing.”60
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Media Alert: Lawyers Committee Re-
sponds to Congressional Critique of ICC: International Criminal Court Serves U.S. Interests,
Will Save American Lives (July 23, 1998) <http://www.lchr.org/media/icc723.htm> [hereinafter
Lawyers Committee Responds] (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (quoting Jerry Fowler as
saying that “[i]f individual states can exercise . . . universal jurisdiction, there surely is no bar to
a group of states joining together to set up a court that does the same thing”).
59. Under the principle of universal jurisdiction, all states have jurisdiction over certain
crimes seen as serious violations of international law, regardless of where these crimes occur or
the nationalities of the perpetrators and victims. The theory behind this principle is that all
states have a common interest in prosecuting such serious violations of international law. See
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 788
(1988) (“[T]he universality principle assumes that every state has an interest in exercising juris-
diction to combat egregious offenses that states universally have condemned.”). Under cus-
tomary international law, genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are all subject to
universal jurisdiction. See Steven R. Ratner, New Democracies, Old Atrocities: An Inquiry in
International Law, 87 GEO. L.J. 707, 715 (1999). For examples of state recognition and use of
the principle of universal jurisdiction, see infra notes 62-63.
In fact, the Genocide Convention imposes an obligation on states to search for suspected
perpetrators of genocide thought to be within their territories. When the suspects are found,
the Genocide Convention imposes a further obligation either to prosecute them within the na-
tional system or to extradite them to another state for prosecution. See Convention on the Pre-
vention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, arts. I, VI-VII, 78 U.N.T.S.
277, 280-82 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
60. Lawyers Committee Responds, supra note 58. But see Madeline Morris, High Crimes
and Misconceptions: The ICC and Nonparty States 26-28 (Oct. 15, 1999) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the author). Professor Morris argues that an international court’s exercise of
jurisdiction would “have very different implications” than would a state’s exercise of universal
jurisdiction, so it is not necessarily true that universal jurisdiction is delegable to an interna-
tional tribunal. Id. at 26. In particular, Professor Morris argues that, while the ICC will not
prosecute states as such, official acts undertaken in compliance with state policy will often form
the basis for prosecutions. Professor Morris contends that bilateral negotiation may be prefer-
able to third-party adjudication in such cases. An international court would also have more
power than would a national court to “create law” in a previously unsettled area, and this new
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1. Does the Exclusion of the Custodial State Really Allow
Criminals to Travel Freely? Despite the concerns of these human
rights organizations, the exclusion of custodial state jurisdiction will
not necessarily provide a “free ticket” to international criminals. As
mentioned above, individual states still can try those accused of war
crimes in their own domestic courts under universal jurisdiction.61
The theory behind universal jurisdiction over such crimes is that
some serious international crimes are so harmful as to be offenses
against the entire world; states trying such criminals thus are acting
on behalf of all states.62 Therefore, a state that has custody of a
suspected war criminal, even if it cannot turn the suspect over to the
ICC, may nonetheless choose to conduct a prosecution in its own
national courts. Accordingly, although the criminal may be free from
prosecution before the ICC, he may not be free to travel the world
without fear of some type of prosecution in some court.63
law could not be revised by a legislature. See id. at 28. The Rome Statute does provide that the
ICC will declare inadmissible cases in which a state that has jurisdiction prosecutes or investi-
gates and decides not to prosecute. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1)(a)-(b), 37 I.L.M
at 1012. Thus, states would not lose the opportunity to negotiate; the perpetrator’s national
state could negotiate for extradition in order to try the suspect in its own courts. Of course, the
national state may not want to do this if it believes the acts were lawful, and a sham prosecution
in the national state would not insulate the defendant from prosecution before the ICC. See id.
61. See supra note 59; see also Joyner, supra note 4, at 155 (“International codification and
consensus since the Second World War have confirmed war crimes as international criminal
acts, thus permitting states to define and punish those extraterritorial crimes wherever, and by
whomever, they are committed.”).
62. See, e.g., Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582-83 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that
universal jurisdiction was a valid basis on which to extradite an accused war criminal to Israel),
vacated on other grounds, 10 F.3d 338, 356 (6th Cir. 1993); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 (1987) (declaring that “[a] state has jurisdiction to define and
prescribe punishment for certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of univer-
sal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes,
and perhaps certain acts of terrorism, even where” no other basis of jurisdiction exists). Profes-
sor Joyner states that Israel’s rationale in prosecuting the Eichmann case was that “[e]very
state may prosecute violations of modern fundamental norms of international law, especially
those relating to war crimes and crimes against humanity.” Joyner, supra note 4, at 168 n.153
(referring to Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 16 P.D. 2033, 36 I.L.R. 5, 277 (S. Ct. 1962)).
63. Some countries have tried suspected war criminals in their national courts. See, e.g.,
Polyukovich v. Regina (1992) 172 C.L.R. 501 (Austl.) (holding that Australian courts may
prosecute individuals living in Australia for war crimes or crimes against humanity committed
on foreign soil); Regina v. Finta [1994] S.C.R. 701 (Can.) (similarly holding that Canadian
courts may prosecute individuals living in Canada for war crimes or crimes against humanity
committed on foreign soil). However, Finta himself was acquitted, and the Canadian Supreme
Court set a high standard for national prosecutions of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
See International Decisions, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 456, 461 (1996) (noting that the Canadian Su-
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In fact, the possibility of such a prosecution may raise the odds
that a perpetrator’s home state will accept the ICC’s jurisdiction over
its national. Proceedings before the court will likely be less biased
than prosecutions before many national courts. It is unlikely that an
international court would conduct an unfair trial or deny a defendant
procedural protections, but a state trying a supposed criminal under
universal jurisdiction may commit such injustices, especially where
there is considerable animosity between the state trying the accused
and the accused’s home state.64
Thus, if an international criminal does venture out of his home
state, he may not have the unlimited passport that human rights or-
ganizations predict. If he is taken into custody in another state, his
national state, even if not a party to the statute, may choose to con-
sent to the ICC’s exercising jurisdiction in that particular case when
faced with the prospect of having one of its nationals prosecuted in
the hostile courts of another state.65 And even if the alleged perpetra-
preme Court in the Finta case “established a higher standard of proof for the prosecution of
war crimes and crimes against humanity than is recognized at international law,” thus making
prosecution of World War II crimes “much more difficult and less likely”); Ruth Wedgwood,
Pinochet and International Law, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 287, 294 (1999) (“The Canadian Su-
preme Court set an unworkable standard for the proof of international crimes, requiring that
the offender must have specific intent to violate international law. . . . [S]tate of mind is elusive
and an offender will rarely have international law provably in mind.”).
The events in the Pinochet case also illustrate that, even in the absence of an interna-
tional court, states will sometimes be willing to exercise universal jurisdiction to bring to justice
those accused of gross violations of international law. The British House of Lords ruled that
head-of-state immunity did not prevent Pinochet from being extradited to Spain to be tried un-
der universal jurisdiction for atrocities committed while he was Chilean head of state. See
Wedgwood, supra, at 291-92. Other European countries in which victims of the Pinochet re-
gime currently reside, including France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland, were
also interested in Pinochet’s extradition, for they, too, were “willing to implement universal
jurisdiction” to bring Pinochet to justice. Id. at 292.
64. As the state of nationality of the perpetrator, however, these states will still be able to
consent to the ICC’s exercising jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis under Article 12(3) of the
Rome Statute. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1010. The complemen-
tarity provisions contained in Article 17 of the statute, which provide that the ICC must deter-
mine that a case “being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” is
inadmissible, may, however, preclude the ICC from exercising jurisdiction if the custodial state
has initiated proceedings in its own national courts. Id. art. 17(1)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1012. Thus,
states that insisted on the exclusion of custodial state jurisdiction may well regret their positions
in the future. These states could well face the possibility of a prosecution of a national before
the national courts of a hostile state that is a party to the statute, a state that could have been
made to turn the accused over to the ICC on this basis.
65. See id. Even leaders of so-called rogue regimes, which would presumably never be-
come parties to the statute, may in theory be subjected to the ICC’s jurisdiction. Assume that
such a leader or former leader travels to another state, which apprehends him and plans to try
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tor’s state does not consent to ICC jurisdiction over the crime, uni-
versal jurisdiction would allow the perpetrator to be tried in other
states’ national courts, thus alleviating some concern that he could
travel freely.66
In fact, most of the criminals who will be able to avoid prosecu-
tion before the ICC based on the statute as currently written would
be able to do so even if the custodial state were included as a state
through which the ICC could obtain jurisdiction. If the custodial state
were included, international criminals would likely not venture into
states that were parties to the statute. Instead, they would remain at
home or limit their travel to states that are not only not parties to the
statute, but also are unlikely to prosecute them under universal juris-
diction.
Critics fear that the ICC will be “largely ineffective in dealing
with rogue regimes,” resulting in leaders “who kill their own people
on their own territory” remaining, for the most part, out of reach.67
him or extradite him to another country for trial, as in the Pinochet case. Faced with the pros-
pect of a trial in that state’s national courts (where procedural guarantees may be lacking and
the death penalty may be available), the leader’s home state may consent to the ICC’s exercis-
ing jurisdiction in that case. However, the custodial state may not have to yield to the ICC. See
Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1012 (listing situations in which the ICC
may determine that a case is inadmissible for its jurisdiction, including cases in which a state
with jurisdiction is conducting a trial or investigation).
66. Of course, the national courts of the other state do not have to try the perpetrator for
war crimes or crimes against humanity. Even though the Genocide Convention does impose an
affirmative obligation to prosecute or extradite those suspected of genocide, see Genocide
Convention, supra note 59, arts. I, VI-VII, at 280-82, in reality, some states do not comply with
this obligation, see Symposium, 1945-1995: Critical Perspectives on the Nuremberg Trials and
State Accountability, Panel II, Comparative Analysis of International and National Tribunals, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 545, 562 (1996) (stating that “[t]he United States definition [of geno-
cide] nearly guarantees that acts of genocide will not be prosecuted in the United States” and is
“so fundamentally inconsistent with international law and the Genocide Convention that it is
clear the United States is not complying with its treaty obligations”).
Similarly, under the Geneva Conventions, states are obliged to prosecute some war
crimes. Since some states fail to comply with these obligations, it seems that some states, per-
haps because of a lack of political will or political pressure from abroad, will continue to de-
cline to prosecute those suspected of serious international crimes. See supra text accompanying
notes 10-13. If the custodial state had been included as a basis for jurisdiction, it could avoid
diplomatic pressure from the suspect’s home state by turning the suspect over to the ICC. Pre-
sumably, the international court would be less vulnerable to diplomatic pressure from one
state. While a trial might be more likely to occur if the ICC could obtain jurisdiction through
the custodial state, a trial in some court still may occur. Thus, international criminals will not be
confined to home, but neither will they be able to travel freely. They only will be able to travel
safely to states they know will not exercise their options to prosecute them under universal ju-
risdiction.
67. Meron, supra note 38, at A15.
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While this proposition rings true, it would be equally true if the cus-
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every time an atrocity has occurred.73 It remains to be seen whether
the Security Council will be more likely to act when it may simply re-
fer a situation to an existing court rather than create a new tribunal
for each situation. This provision is not an ideal means for the ICC to
obtain jurisdiction, because whether to apply international humani-
tarian law to a given situation should not depend on whether the Se-
curity Council can agree to act.74 Yet, its possibility lessens the chance
of a suspected war criminal’s remaining out of the ICC’s reach.
B. Opting out of War Crimes Jurisdiction
The “Transitional Provision,” or “opt-out” clause,75 has also been
the subject of much criticism since the statute was adopted.76 Human
rights organizations have been especially critical of the provision.
Richard Dicker, leader of the International Criminal Court Cam-
paign of Human Rights Watch, says of the opt-out provision: “This
sends a message to potential war criminals—you’ve got six-and-a-half
years to do the job. . . . That’s not justice. That’s nonsense.”77 Am-
nesty International has appealed to states to refrain from making opt-
out declarations under Article 124 and has suggested that “the
United Nations should not accept troops for its peacekeeping opera-
Charter of the United Nations, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecu-
tion of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan Citi-
zens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994 . . . shall func-
tion in accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.
73. See, e.g., Meron, supra note 8, at 554 (“The heinous activities of the Pol Pot regime in
Cambodia and the use of poison gas by Iraq against its Kurdish population are among the many
atrocities left unpunished by either international or national courts.”).
74. See id. at 555:
While supporting the Security Council’s establishment of international tribunals for
Yugoslavia . . . and Rwanda, I am concerned about the selectivity involved in a sys-
tem where the establishment of a tribunal for a given conflict situation depends on
whether consensus to apply chapter VII of the U.N. Charter can be obtained. What is
needed is a uniform and definite corpus of international humanitarian law that can
be applied apolitically to internal atrocities everywhere, and that recognizes the role
of all states in the vindication of such law.
75. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068:
Notwithstanding article 12 paragraph 1, a State, on becoming a party to this Statute,
may declare that, for a period of seven years after the entry into force of this Statute
for the State concerned, it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect
to the category of crimes referred to in article 8 [war crimes] when a crime is alleged
to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory. A declaration under this
article may be withdrawn at any time.
76. See, e.g., Lawyers Committee Denounces, supra note 54.
77. Fight to the Finish, supra note 45 (quoting Richard Dicker).
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tions from states which refuse to recognize the Court’s jurisdiction
over war crimes.”78 Even some intergovernmental organizations dis-
approve of the provision. In fact, the Standing Committee of the Par-
liamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe recently adopted a
recommendation requesting that its member states not make declara-
tions under Article 124.79
The United States is outraged by the opt-out provision as well,
but for different reasons. The head of the United States’ delegation
to the Rome Conference, David Scheffer, interprets the provision as
allowing a state whose leadership is willing to commit war crimes to
join the treaty and then to opt out of war crimes jurisdiction, thus in-
sulating its leaders from prosecution before the ICC for war crimes
for seven years, while a nonparty to the treaty could send soldiers
into that state on peacekeeping missions and have them immediately
subjected to war crimes prosecutions before the ICC.80 In the view of
the United States, it is an unacceptable paradox to allow citizens of
nations that ratify the agreement and take advantage of the opt-out
provision to be immune from war crimes prosecutions for seven
years, while allowing citizens of states that do not ratify the agree-
ment to be subjected to war crimes jurisdiction as soon as the ICC
comes into existence.81
Although many states and nongovernmental organizations have
been vocal in their opposition to Article 124’s opt-out provision, its
precise meaning is not clear from the statute.82 Perhaps owing to the
78. Pierre Sané, Appeal by Amnesty International to All States to Ratify the Statute of the
International Criminal Court as Soon as Possible (May 13, 1999) <http://www.iccnow.org/html/
ai19990513.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (appeal by Pierre Sané, Secretary Gen-
eral of Amnesty International).
79. See Standing Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, In-
ternational Criminal Court Recommendation 1408 (1999) <http://www.iccnow.org/html/
pace199905.html> (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
80. See Transcript of Statement by the Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues and
Head of the U.S. Delegation to the UN Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of a Perma-
nent International Criminal Court Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Washington,
D.C., U.S. Dep’t of State Dispatch, Aug. 1, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12885550; U.S. Dep’t of
State: Daily Press Briefing, supra note 48.
81. See, e.g., Gary Dempsey, Courting Global Disaster, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1998, at
A15 (quoting State Department Spokesman James Rubin as saying, “Never before has a treaty
put itself over those who have not been included in it.” Rubin further stated, “Paradoxically,
the treaty also says the nations that ratify the agreement can opt out of the court’s jurisdiction
over war crimes for seven years, while citizens of those nations that do not ratify the treaty can
be subjected to the court’s jurisdiction immediately.”).
82. See Mahnoush H. Arsanjani, The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 93
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haste with which it was added to the statute, or perhaps owing to a
deliberate desire on the part of the negotiators to leave the article in
vague terms, many ambiguities remain in Article 124. It is not at all
certain that the article will hamper the ICC’s effective operation to
the degree that human rights organizations fear. Although many hu-
man rights organizations believe that the opt-out provision will allow
perpetrators of war crimes to enjoy immunity and kill with impu-
nity,83 the prospects for bringing these international criminals to jus-
tice are not as bleak as the human rights organizations suggest. While
Article 124 will make it more difficult for the ICC to obtain jurisdic-
tion in some cases, it will not preclude the ICC from obtaining juris-
diction in most cases. Moreover, the article is not likely to lead to the
realization of the United States’ concern that citizens of nonparty
states will be more likely to face war crimes prosecutions before the
ICC than citizens of states that are parties.
1. The Effects of the Opt-out Provision on the ICC’s Exercise of
Jurisdiction. This section will examine the effects of an opt-out from
the ICC’s exercise of war crimes jurisdiction in four different types of
situations: (1) cases in which perpetrators commit war crimes on the
territory of their own states; (2) cases in which perpetrators commit
war crimes on the territory of other parties; (3) cases in which
perpetrators commit war crimes on the territory of nonparties; and
(4) cases in which nationals of nonparties commit war crimes on the
territory of parties that have opted out.
a. Cases in which perpetrators commit war crimes on their own
national territory. Concerns of human rights organizations that
perpetrators of war crimes will go free are most likely to be realized
in cases in which offenders commit war crimes within the territory of
their own states. If the state in question is a party to the statute, has
exercised its option to refuse war crimes jurisdiction, and is still
within the opt-out period, the offender would seem to be out of the
ICC’s reach. If the situation were of particular gravity, however, as in
the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, the United Nations Security
Council could conceivably act under its Chapter VII power84 to refer
AM. J. INT’L L. 22, 42 (1999) (noting that the statute does not resolve possible conflicts of juris-
diction between two parties).
83. See supra notes 76-78.
84. See supra note 23 (outlining Chapter VII powers).
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the situation to the ICC.85 Unfortunately, it is not clear that the
Security Council would usually take such a step.86 While the Security
Council did act under its Chapter VII powers to create special
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,87 numerous other
humanitarian law violations did not motivate the Security Council to
take action.88
The opt-out provision is not likely to be the only reason that
criminals who commit war crimes within their own countries will not
be brought before the ICC. In fact, the home countries of such crimi-
nals will probably not become parties to the statute at all. The Pol
Pots and Saddam Husseins of the world are not likely to agree volun-
tarily to a court that could someday try them. In addition, even if
such a state does become a party to the statute as written,89 it might
not have become a party if opting out had not been a possibility.
Thus, even though the opt-out clause might in theory preclude prose-
cution before the ICC in a case in which a national of a state party
that has opted out of war crimes jurisdiction commits war crimes on
that state’s territory,90 in practice there will be few, if any, such cases
in which the perpetrator would have been prosecutable before the
ICC in any case.
b. Cases in which nationals of a state party commit war crimes
85. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 13(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1010.
86. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text (providing examples of Security Council
exercise of its Chapter VII powers).
87. See id.
88. See supra note 73. Moreover, if one of the five permanent members of the Security
Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the Russian Federation)
were involved in the case, that state’s veto power would in all likelihood prevent the case from
being referred to the ICC. See U.N. CHARTER art. 27, para. 3 (requiring that decisions of the
Security Council on anything other than procedural matters have “the concurring votes of the
permanent members”).
89. In fact, most such states are unlikely to become parties, since there is no means by
which a state can insulate its nationals from prosecution for genocide or crimes against human-
ity. As discussed below, many of the same crimes that are chargeable as war crimes may also be
chargeable as crimes against humanity. See infra Part III.B.2. In addition, the opt-out expires
after seven years, at which point the state concerned would either have to withdraw from the
statute, see Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068 (“A State Party may, by
written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw from
this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notifica-
tion, unless the notification specifies a later date.”), or face the possibility of prosecution of its
nationals for war crimes. See id. arts. 8, 12, 124, 127, 37 I.L.M. at 1006, 1010, 1068, 1069.
90. Even then, prosecution might be possible because many acts that constitute war crimes
also fall under the definition of crimes against humanity. See infra Part III.B.2.
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on the territory of another state party. Assume that State A and State
B are both parties to the Rome Statute and that A has chosen to opt
out of jurisdiction over war crimes pursuant to Article 124, while B
has not opted out of war crimes jurisdiction. Suppose a national of
State A commits war crimes on the territory of State B. The statute is
not clear as to whether it would then be possible for the ICC to
exercise jurisdiction over the crime pursuant to Article 12(2)(a),
under which the ICC has jurisdiction if the state on whose territory
the alleged crime occurred is a party.91 In other words, the statute
does not clarify whether A’s decision to opt out has precluded any
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC, or whether it just precludes the
ICC from using the fact that A is a party as the basis for jurisdiction.
In fact, the article permits conflicting readings on this point by
providing that a state can “declare that . . . it does not accept the ju-
risdiction of the Court with respect to [war crimes] when a crime is
alleged to have been committed by its nationals or on its territory.”92
This statement could be interpreted to mean that the state exercising
this option may prevent the ICC from exercising jurisdiction in all
cases in which a crime is allegedly committed by one of its nationals
or on its territory. However, the article does not compel this reading.
To interpret it in such a way would allow the state that opts out to in-
terfere with the obligations of another state under the statute. If the
war crime occurs on the territory of State B, Article 12(2)(a) gives
the ICC jurisdiction. Allowing A’s opt-out decision to preclude any
exercise of jurisdiction by the ICC would thus, in effect, allow A’s de-
cision to overrule B’s. Though B would have decided by ratifying the
statute that the ICC would have jurisdiction over any war crimes
committed by B’s nationals or on B’s territory, A’s opt-out, if inter-
preted in this broad way, would mean that even though B had ac-
cepted the provisions of a treaty, the treaty could not become fully
effective for B because of a choice made by A. While A’s opt-out de-
cision can prevent it from being the “hook” on which the ICC hangs
91. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(2)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1010; see also Arsanjani,
supra note 82, at 42:
[T]here may be situations in which a conflict of jurisdiction may arise as between two
states parties in relation to war crimes. For example, the territorial state has con-
sented to the court’s jurisdiction unconditionally, while the state of nationality of the
accused has opted out of the court’s jurisdiction over war crimes for seven years. The
statute is silent on the interpretation of Article 12 on the jurisdiction of the court in
the event of such a conflict.
92. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068.
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its jurisdiction, if there is another hook available to the court, A
should not be seen as having the unilateral power to stop the ICC
from exercising jurisdiction.93
c. Cases in which perpetrators commit crimes on the territory
of nonparties. Where a party’s national is suspected of committing a
war crime on the territory of a nonparty,  the fact that the party has
opted out of war crimes jurisdiction can make it more difficult, but by
no means impossible, for the ICC to obtain jurisdiction, even absent
Security Council action. In short, the fact that a state has opted out of
war crimes jurisdiction may not necessarily mean that the perpetrator
has a “licence to kill.”94
For example, assume State A is a party to the Rome Statute and
has opted out of jurisdiction over war crimes, while State C is not a
party to the statute. Suppose that a national of State A commits war
crimes on the territory of State C. The ICC cannot obtain jurisdiction
under Article 12(2)(b), which grants it jurisdiction when the ac-
cused’s state is a party to the statute, because that state (i.e., State A)
has opted out of war crimes jurisdiction under the statute. However,
the ICC can still obtain jurisdiction under Article 12(2)(a), in con-
junction with Article 12(3), which allows a state to consent to juris-
diction with respect to a specific crime.95 State C, the nonparty terri-
torial state, thus could accept the ICC’s jurisdiction in this particular
case.96
Moreover, even if State C does not consent to the ICC’s exer-
cising jurisdiction over the crime, the perpetrator may not necessarily
go free. Belligerent states have long had the right to prosecute mem-
bers of enemy armed forces for war crimes.97 In addition, within this
93. Similar analysis would apply if the territorial state had opted out of war crimes juris-
diction, while the state of nationality had not.
94. Sage, supra note 15, at 35. For further criticism of the opt-out provision, see Fight to
the Finish, supra note 45.
95. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 12(3), 37 I.L.M. at 1010.
96. This acceptance would be valid if, as argued above, Article 124 only prevents the state
opting out from being the ICC’s jurisdictional hook. Although the opt-out provision in this case
does not interfere with another party’s obligation under the statute, it would make little sense
to interpret Article 124 as only preventing the opt-out state from being the jurisdictional hook
in some cases while interpreting it to allow the opt-out state to preclude all ICC jurisdiction in
others.
97. See Yoram Dinstein, The Universality Principle and War Crimes, in THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT INTO THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 17, 19 (Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green
eds., 1998) (“The proposition that belligerent States are accorded an international legal right to
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century, it has become settled in customary international law98 that
universal jurisdiction applies to war crimes.99 Thus, the principle of
universal jurisdiction allows any state, not just a belligerent, to prose-
cute any war criminal without regard to “the geographic, temporal, or
national dimensions of the offense.”100 Therefore, if State C can ob-
tain custody of the suspected war criminal, it has the authority to
prosecute him in its national courts. In fact, any other state that ob-
tains custody of the suspect can prosecute him under universal juris-
diction.
The existence of universal jurisdiction may cause states to think
twice about opting out of war crimes jurisdiction. State A may well
prefer to have its nationals tried before an international court, rather
than before the courts of State C, especially if the alleged war crimes
occurred during an armed conflict between State A and State C.101
Presumably, the international court would be neutral, while the na-
tional courts of State C might be biased, or perceived as such.
d. Cases in which a national of a nonparty commits a war
crime on the territory of a party that has opted out. As discussed
earlier, the United States fears that “a known human rights violator
could sign the treaty, opt out of war crimes and yet seek to prosecute
the United States when its peacekeeping forces seek to enforce peace
and security in that particular country.”102 These concerns appear
reasonable, for it would be patently unfair for a state having declared
that “it does not accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to
prosecute members of the enemy armed forces charged with war crimes has long been doctri-
nally recognized.”).
98. Customary international law refers to international norms that have been developed as
a result of states’ acting out of a perceived obligation. In other words, the term customary in-
ternational law refers to “a usage felt by those who follow it to be an obligatory one.” J.L.
BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF
PEACE 60 (5th ed. 1955). For further explanation of this concept, see IAN BROWNLIE,
PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-15 (2d ed. 1973).
99. See Dinstein, supra note 97, at 20 (“While some scholars continue what may be called
a rear-guard action against acceptance of the universality principle as appertaining to war
crimes, by now it must be abundantly clear that the issue has been settled in customary intern a-
tional law.”).
100. Id.; see also supra notes 59-63 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
102. U.S. Dep’t of State: Daily Press Briefing, supra note 48. It is important to remember
that the ICC will not be prosecuting states, but individuals. People who have committed viola-
tions of international law are international criminals, and some argue that they thereby lose, or
at least should lose, the protection of their states. See A Court Is Born, supra note 41.
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[war crimes] when a crime is alleged to have been committed by its
national or on its territory”103 to be able to invoke the statute at its
pleasure.104 If a state has opted out of war crimes jurisdiction, it
cannot very well insist that the ICC selectively invoke the very
jurisdiction it has denied in order to prosecute members of the
United States armed forces.
Article 124 does allow a state party to withdraw its declaration
under the article at any time.105 However, if the state withdraws its
declaration, it would no longer be providing its own nationals with
immunity for their war crimes, and its war criminals would therefore
be subject to prosecution before the ICC. A state may make an Arti-
cle 124 declaration only “on becoming a party to [the] Statute.”106
Thus if a state withdraws its declaration, as it clearly has the right to
do, in order to see a specific act prosecuted before the ICC, it may
not then reinstate its declaration in order to continue providing its
nationals with immunity from war crimes prosecution before the
ICC.
Article 12(3) does allow a state to accept the jurisdiction of the
ICC for a single crime, but that article applies to “State[s] which [are]
not Part[ies] to this Statute,” not to state parties that have opted out
of certain provisions.107 Thus, under a logical interpretation of the
statute, the concerns of the United States that a state will be able to
subject members of a United States peacekeeping force to war crimes
prosecution before the ICC, while retaining immunity from war
crimes prosecution for its own citizens, are groundless.
Furthermore, the birth of this international criminal court will
not subject United States nationals to prosecution for war crimes in
circumstances in which prosecutions could not have occurred previ-
ously. As discussed above,108 universal jurisdiction over war crimes al-
ready exists. Thus, a United States national who commits a war crime
abroad can already be prosecuted by that foreign government, or, in
103. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068.
104. There is international legal precedent showing that courts may be hostile towards par-
ties seeking to enjoy the best of both worlds. See, e.g., Case of Certain Norwegian Loans (Fr. v.
Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9, 23-24 (July 6) (holding that, in cases before the International Court of Jus-
tice, if one party to a dispute has accepted that court’s jurisdiction with a reservation, the other
party may invoke that reservation against it under the principle of reciprocity).
105. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068.
106. Id.
107. Id. art. 12, 37 I.L.M. at 1010.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 99-100.
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fact, by the national legal system of any nation in which he is in cus-
tody.109 Thus, if the foreign government refers the case to the ICC in-
stead of prosecuting it in its own national system, the United States
national accused of war crimes may very well be more likely to re-
ceive a fair trial.110
2. Another Option: The Overlap Between Charges of War
Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. In many cases in which an
offender can be charged with war crimes, the offender can also be
charged with crimes against humanity. For example, according to the
Rome Statute itself, the category “war crimes” includes “willful
killing”111 “when committed as a part of a plan or policy or as part of
large-scale commission of such crimes.”112 The category “crimes
against humanity” includes “murder”113 “when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population, with knowledge of the attack.”114 Torture is also included
under both headings,115 as well as numerous other acts.116 If a state
opts out of jurisdiction over war crimes, a national of that state who
has committed a war crime may not escape the jurisdiction of the
ICC if the war crime could also be characterized as a crime against
humanity, as no opt-out provision exists for crimes against
humanity.117 International humanitarian law already contains
109. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
110. See Douglass W. Cassel, Jr., U.S. Fears Undercut Tribunal, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Aug.
18, 1998, at 5 (“So what’s the problem? Americans who today commit any crime overseas can
be prosecuted by the foreign government. The treaty merely permits that same government to
agree that the case will be heard by an international court, where Americans will more likely
get a fair shake.”). However, the ICC might be more immune to diplomatic, political, or eco-
nomic pressure by the United States not to prosecute its nationals. Even so, if the United States
investigates the incident in good faith, the ICC will not go forward. See Rome Statute, supra
note 2, art. 17(1)(a)-(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1012. The United States does not have such an assurance
in the case of a national being tried before another state’s national courts.
111. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 8(2)(a)(i), 37 I.L.M at 1006.
112. Id. art. 8(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1006.
113. Id. art. 7(1)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1004.
114. Id. art. 7(1), 37 I.L.M. at 1004.
115. See id. art. 8(2)(a)(ii), 37 I.L.M. at 1006 (War Crimes); id. art. 7(1)(f), 37 I.L.M. at 1004
(Crimes Against Humanity).
116. For example, “[w]illfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health” is
included as a war crime. Id. art. 8(2)(a)(iii), 37 I.L.M. at 1005. “[O]ther acts . . . intentionally
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health,” are included
as crimes against humanity. Id. art. 7(1)(k), 37 I.L.M. at 1005.
117. See id. art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068 (providing opt-out only for “crimes referred to in ar-
ticle 8 [war crimes]”).
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examples of suspects’ being charged with both war crimes and crimes
against humanity for essentially the same acts. For example, in the
Tadić case before the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), Dusko Tadić was charged with both crimes
against humanity and “violations of the laws and customs of war” for
such acts as rape,118 murder,119 “inhumane acts,”120 and “cruel
treatment”121 arising out of the same sequence of events.
Some commentators have even suggested that charges of crimes
against humanity replace charges of war crimes altogether.122 While
scholars concede that this merging of the two categories has not yet
happened under the current definitions of the crimes,123 the ICTY has
expanded the application of crimes against humanity in recent
years.124 The Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY has “used crimes
against humanity charges whenever it has been practicable to do
so.”125
The statute does not contain an opt-out provision for crimes
against humanity, though many states requested one. Thus, even if a
state has opted out of war crimes jurisdiction, the acts in question
may still be prosecuted before the ICC if they can be characterized as
crimes against humanity. As a result, it is even less likely that war
criminals will go free because of the opt-out provision.
118. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Initial Indictment, No. IT-94-1-T (I.C.T.Y. 1995), reprinted in
34 I.L.M. 1011, 1030 (alleging, in Count 4.3, that “forcible sexual intercourse” constitutes a war
crime and, in Count 4.4, that “rape” is a crime against humanity).
119. See id. Count 5.3 (alleging “murder” as a war crime); id. Count 5.4 (alleging “murder”
of the same victim as a crime against humanity).
120. Id. Count 5.7 (alleging “inhumane acts” as a crime against humanity).
121. Id. Count 5.6 (alleging “cruel treatment” of the same victim as a war crime).
122. See William J. Fenrick, Should Crimes Against Humanity Replace War Crimes?, 37
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 767, 769 (1999) (discussing the views of Professor Leslie Green, a
war crimes prosecutor in India in the 1940s, who suggested that charges of crimes against hu-
manity should replaces charges of war crimes (citing L.C. Green, ‘Grave Breaches’ or Crimes
Against Humanity?, 8 U.S.A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL STUD. 19 (1997-98))).
123. See id. at 780.
124. See id. (explaining that before the ICTY came into existence, crimes against humanity
had only been charged when “the civilian victim group had been under the control of or in the
hands of the group with which the perpetrator was linked,” such as “in camps, in occupied terri-
tory, or in the national territory of the state or organization supporting . . . the policy of at-
tacking the civilian group”).
125. Id. at 785. However, Fenrick cautions that the “content of the crimes against humanity
concept is as yet too skeletal to provide a satisfactory replacement [for war crimes charges].”
Id.
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CONCLUSION
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is not
perfect. Considering the wide disagreement that existed at the begin-
ning of the conference, however, it is impressive that the final docu-
ment garnered as much support as it did. The statute does have some
weaknesses, as will any compromise document, but overall it provides
an excellent starting point for the consistent prosecution of interna-
tional crimes.
Despite its shortcomings, this court will not be as weak as human
rights organizations argue. The fact that the custodial state’s being a
party to the statute does not automatically lead to ICC jurisdiction is
unfortunate, but not crippling. Ideally, all war criminals should be
tried in front of an international tribunal, but the existence of univer-
sal jurisdiction means that a custodial state can always try the suspect
in its own national system. Thus, war criminals cannot travel freely
without fear of prosecution in some court. Furthermore, if a war
criminal does travel to a state that is willing to grant him a safe har-
bor rather than prosecute him for his crimes, that state may not be a
party to the statute anyway, making it irrelevant in many cases that
the custodial state is not included.
Undoubtedly, the Article 124 provisions allowing parties to opt
out of war crimes jurisdiction will also weaken the ICC to some de-
gree, but this article should not be as paralyzing as human rights or-
ganizations anticipate. If another state party is either the territorial or
national state in a case, then one state’s exercise of the opt-out right
should not affect the ICC’s ability to obtain jurisdiction. In theory,
the opt-out should also not affect the state’s other obligations under
the treaty, but this may, of course, be a different story in practice. 126
126. This Note does not analyze in detail the effect an opt-out of war crimes jurisdiction
under Article 124 would have on a state’s other obligations under the treaty. The treaty is un-
clear as to whether the opt-out would function as an opt-out of all of the state’s treaty obliga-
tions with respect to the crimes covered by Article 124 or just as an opt-out of being the in-
strument through which the ICC obtains jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 124,
37 I.L.M. at 1068. In other words, if the ICC does obtain jurisdiction in another way (such as
through the territorial state when the national state has opted out), it is unclear whether the
state that has opted out must still comply with other related obligations under the treaty. Arti-
cle 127, which permits withdrawal from the statute, directly addresses this issue by declaring
that a withdrawing state is not freed from obligations that it incurred before its withdrawal be-
came effective, see id. art. 127, 37 I.L.M. at 1069, but Article 124 is silent on the issue, see id.
art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068. There are several obligations under the treaty that might be affected
by this determination. For example, Article 59 requires a state party to arrest suspects in its
territory if requested to do so. See id. art. 59, 37 I.L.M. at 1034. The statute also includes a
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The opt-out provision’s practical consequences will also be re-
duced to the extent that the category of crimes known as “war
crimes” overlaps with the category of crimes known as “crimes
against humanity.” Opting out as to war crimes will not affect the
feasibility of charging an offender with crimes against humanity for
many of the same acts. The existence of universal jurisdiction will
also ameliorate the effect of a party’s choice to opt out. If a war
criminal wanders from a home state that has opted out of war crimes
jurisdiction into a state that is not willing to tolerate his presence, the
state can try the offender under universal jurisdiction, even if that
state has no legal basis for turning the criminal over to the ICC. Uni-
versal jurisdiction may actually prevent some states from embracing
the opt-out provision, or at least persuade some states to withdraw
their declarations under the provision in order to move a prosecution
from the national courts of another, potentially biased, state to the
theoretically impartial ICC.
Moreover, the objections of the United States seem to be based
on a misinterpretation of the treaty. Parties will not be able to opt out
of war crimes jurisdiction and then send war crimes cases involving
United States nationals to the ICC. The treaty will not make possible
prosecutions of United States nationals that are not already possible
through the exercise of universal jurisdiction. In fact, the effect of the
establishment of the ICC would be to move any such prosecutions to
a forum that is likely to be more impartial. The fact that soldiers on
peacekeeping missions have not yet been subjected to charges of war
“[g]eneral obligation to cooperate,” which compels state parties to “cooperate fully with the
Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.” Id. art.
86, 37 I.L.M. at 1051. A state can declare under Article 124 that it “ does not accept the jurisdic-
tion of the Court” over war crimes alleged to have been committed on its territory or by its na-
tionals, id. art. 124, 37 I.L.M. at 1068 (emphasis added). Article 86 requires cooperation, how-
ever, with respect to “crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” and makes no mention of
exempting a state from cooperation when it does not accept the ICC’s jurisdiction. Id. art. 86,
37 I.L.M. at 1034.
This issue could become important in some circumstances. If a national of State A, a
party that has exercised its Article 124 option to opt out of war crimes jurisdiction, commits a
war crime on the territory of State B, the ICC should be able, as we have already seen, to exe r-
cise jurisdiction pursuant to Article 12(2)(a). See id. art. 12(2)(a), 37 I.L.M. at 1010. If, how-
ever, if the suspect is in State A, and State A refuses to cooperate with the ICC because it does
not accept jurisdiction, the ICC could do little to obtain custody of the suspect. Of course, there
is no guarantee that even states that have not opted out of war crimes jurisdiction will comply
with such obligations; however, the opt-out provisions may give states a somewhat more legiti-
mate basis for failing to do so. Having at least an arguably legitimate basis for a refusal to com-
ply with otherwise clearly binding international obligations may lessen the international embar-
rassment associated with such a refusal.
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crimes under universal jurisdiction seems to negate the theory that
leaders in states that currently have populations of peacekeeping sol-
diers would wish to bring such charges before an international tribu-
nal, unless the charges were indeed based on more than mere anti-
American attitudes. Since the ICC would not take the case unless the
justice system in the United States refused to do so,127 United States
worries are extremely difficult to understand. Despite the flaws in the
Rome Statute’s jurisdictional provisions, the ICC, once it comes into
existence, should prove to be a useful mechanism for bringing to jus-
tice those accused of gross violations of humanitarian law.
127. See id. art. 17(1)(a)-(b), 37 I.L.M. at 1012 (declaring that the ICC will determine a case
to be inadmissible where it is “being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdic-
tion over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to carry out the investigation or prosecu-
tion,” or where the case “has been investigated by a State which has jurisdiction over it and the
State has decided not to prosecute . . . unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or
inability of the State genuinely to prosecute”).
